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Abstract 
 
This article discusses the use of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) in decision-making 
regarding the safety of complex technological systems.  The insights gained by QRA are 
compared with those from traditional safety methods and it is argued that the two 
approaches complement each other.  It is argued that peer review is an essential part of 
the QRA process.  The importance of risk-informed rather than risk-based decision-
making is emphasized.  Engineering insights derived from QRAs are always used in 
combination with traditional safety requirements and it is in this context that they should 
be reviewed and critiqued.  Examples from applications in nuclear power, space systems, 
and an incinerator of chemical agents are given to demonstrate the practical benefits of 
QRA.  Finally, several common criticisms raised against QRA are addressed.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been about thirty years since Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) was first 
applied to large technological systems1.  Since then, we have seen many methodological 
advances and applications to nuclear power reactors (where it is called Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment - PRA), space systems, waste repositories (where it is called Performance 
Assessment), and incinerators of chemical munitions. 
 
In every application, I have observed a familiar pattern of progress.  At first (Phase 1), 
the safety community of that industry is very skeptical about the usefulness of this new 
technology.  Then (Phase 2), as engineers and decision makers become more familiar 
with the technology, they begin to pay attention to the insights produced by QRA.  
Typically, the decision makers first pay attention to the “negative” insights, i.e., those 
that reveal failure modes of the system that had not been identified previously.  Actions 
are taken to make these failure modes and their consequences less likely.  With time 
(Phase 3), confidence in QRA increases as more safety analysts use it and they begin to 
pay attention to the “positive” insights, i.e., that some of the previously imposed safety 
requirements can be relaxed because either they do not contribute to safety or they 
contribute a very small amount that can not be justified when it is compared with the 
corresponding cost.  Entering Phase 3 usually requires a cultural change regarding safety 
management.  This change is not always easy for engineers who have been using 
traditional “deterministic” methods for years.  In all three phases, risk insights alone are 
never the sole basis for decision-making. 
 
Of course, there are no sharp lines dividing the three phases.  The phase in which a 
particular industry is depends on the extent to which it is regulated.  Thus, the heavily 
regulated US nuclear power industry entered Phase 1 in 1975 and Phase 2 a few years 
later.  The first regulatory guidance on how risk information could be used in regulatory 
affairs was issued in 19982, which marks the beginning of Phase 3.  It took about a 
quarter century for Phase 3 to begin.  This is evidence of the caution with which QRA is 
accepted by real decision-makers.  Most foreign nuclear regulatory agencies are still in 
 4
Phase 2 and are watching carefully the US experiment with Phase 3.  In my view, NASA 
is in Phase 1 at this time and is cautiously experimenting with more substantive use of 
QRA insights. 
 
Citizen groups that oppose a particular decision or industry frequently raise questions 
about the validity of QRA, especially the “Q” part (see, for example, reference 3).  
Although there is occasionally a reply by responsible groups4, these criticisms, especially 
articles in the popular press, a recent example being reference 5, remain largely 
unanswered. 
 
My purpose in this article is to address some of these criticisms and to place the use of 
QRA in perspective.  It is my thesis that QRAs should be viewed as an additional tool in 
safety analysis that improves safety-related decision-making.  QRA is not a wholesale 
replacement of traditional safety methods or philosophies.  QRA analysts will be the first 
to admit that this tool is not perfect, yet it represents tremendous progress toward rational 
decision-making. 
 
2. TRADITIONAL SAFETY ANALYSIS 
 
It is important to recognize that even traditional safety analyses must deal with 
probabilities, but, unlike in QRA, these probabilities are not quantified1.  The evaluation 
of safety is typically bottom-up, i.e., it starts with postulated failures and proceeds to 
identify their consequences.  If an event, such as the failure of a component, is judged to 
lead to unacceptable consequences, measures are taken either to make it less likely 
(without knowing quantitatively by how much) or to mitigate its potential consequences.  
Typically, these actions include the introduction of redundant elements and additional 
safety margins, i.e., the difference between the failure point and the anticipated operating 
point is made larger.  These actions are based on engineering judgment informed by 
                                                 
1 Traditional safety analyses are often called “deterministic.”  This is a misnomer.  Uncertainties 
are always present. 
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analyses, tests, and operating experience. The result is frequently a complex set of 
requirements for the design and operation of the system.   
 
A facility that meets these requirements is judged “acceptable” in the sense that there is 
no “undue risk” to the public or the crew.  What “undue risk” is remains unquantified.  
The presumption is that meeting the requirements guarantees adequate protection of 
public and crew health and safety, i.e., the (unquantified) risk is acceptably low. 
 
3. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
In its bare essence, QRA answers the three questions posed in Reference 6, namely:  i.  
What can go wrong?  ii.  How likely is it? and iii.  What are the consequences?  It is a 
top-down approach that proceeds as follows: 
 
1. A set of undesirable end states (adverse consequences) is defined, e.g., in terms of 
risk to the public, loss of crew, and loss of the system.  These answer the 3rd 
question of Reference 6. 
 
2. For each end state, a set of disturbances to normal operation is developed which, 
if uncontained or unmitigated, can lead to the end state.  These are called 
initiating events (IEs). 
 
3. Event and fault trees or other logic diagrams are employed to identify sequences 
of events that start with an IE and end at an end state.  Thus, accident scenarios 
are generated.  These scenarios include hardware failures, human errors, fires, and 
natural phenomena.  The dependencies among failures of systems and redundant 
components (common-cause failures) receive particular attention. These scenarios 
answer the first question. 
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4. The probabilities of these scenarios are evaluated using all available evidence, 
primarily past experience and expert judgment.  These probabilities are the 
answer to the second question. 
 
5. The accident scenarios are ranked according to their expected frequency of 
occurrence. 
 
A peer review by independent experts is an essential part of the process.  Depending on 
the significance of the issue, this review may involve national and international experts 
occasionally supported by staff.  The first PRAs for nuclear power reactors and severe 
accidents were subjected to such detailed reviews7-8.  NASA’s QRA for the International 
Space Station was also subjected to peer review9.  The QRA for the Tooele incinerator of 
chemical munitions, sponsored by the US Army, was reviewed by independent experts10 
and the whole operation was under the oversight of an independent committee of the 
National Research Council11.  These reviews had significant impact on the respective 
QRAs.  The PRA Standard issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
contains a peer review as an integral part12.  Guidance on peer reviews can be found in 
reference 13.  Insights from QRAs should not be used in decision-making unless they 
have been subjected to a peer review by independent experts. 
 
4. QRA BENEFITS 
 
QRA has been found useful because it 
 
1. Considers thousands of scenarios that involve multiple failures, thus providing an 
in-depth understanding of system failure modes. Such an enormous number of 
possible accident scenarios is not investigated by traditional methods.  The 
completeness of the analysis is enhanced by the QRA investigation significantly. 
 
2. Increases the probability that complex interactions between 
events/systems/operators will be identified. 
 7
 
3. Provides a common understanding of the problem, thus facilitating 
communication among various stakeholder groups. 
 
4. Is an integrated approach, thus identifying the needs for contributions from 
diverse disciplines such as the engineering and the social and behavioral sciences. 
 
5. Focuses on uncertainty quantification and creates a better picture of what the 
community of experts knows or does not know about a particular issue, thus 
providing valuable input to decisions regarding needed research in diverse 
disciplines, e.g., physical phenomena and human errors. 
 
6. Facilitates risk management by identifying the dominant accident scenarios, so 
that resources are not wasted on items that are insignificant contributors to risk. 
 
 
5. QRA LIMITATIONS 
 
Several items that are either not handled well or not at all by current QRAs are: 
 
1. Human errors during accident conditions.  There is general agreement among 
analysts that the Human Reliability Handbook14 provides adequate guidance for 
human errors during routine operations, e.g., maintenance.  For an accident in 
progress, we can distinguish between errors of omission (the crew fails to take 
prescribed actions) and errors of commission (the crew does something that 
worsens the situation).  These errors, especially those of commission, are not 
handled well and research efforts are underway to improve the situation.  I point 
out, however, that this is a good example of the 5th benefit that I mentioned in 
Section 4.  Even in times of very limited resources, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has expended significant resources on research on errors of 
commission15.  This work has benefited tremendously from the insights developed 
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by human error theorists, e.g., reference 16.  It is also important to point out that 
experience has shown that the crews often become innovative during accidents 
and use unusual means for mitigation.  These human actions are not modeled in 
QRAs. 
 
2. Digital software failures.  This is an active area of research.  The aim is not to 
quantify the failure probabilities but, rather, to understand the kinds of failure 
modes that may be introduced.  It is to the credit of QRA analysts that they have 
not rushed to use any of the many models available in the literature that treat 
software as black boxes and assign failure rates to them based on dubious 
assumptions.  Protecting against digital software errors is still within the realm of 
traditional safety methods, e.g., by requiring extensive testing and the use of 
diverse software systems. 
 
3. Safety culture.  When asked, managers of hazardous activities or facilities say that 
they put safety first.  Unfortunately, experience shows that this is not always the 
case.  While it is relatively easy to ascribe an accident that has occurred to a bad 
safety culture, the fact is that defining indicators of a good or bad safety culture in 
a predictive way remains elusive.  QRAs certainly do not include the influence of 
culture on crew behavior and one can make a good argument that they will not do 
so for a very long time, if ever. 
 
4. Design and manufacturing errors.  These are especially important for equipment 
that would be required to operate under unusual conditions, such as accident 
environments.  Traditional safety methods of testing and equipment qualification 
address these errors.  It is encouraging to note that a study by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission17 found that, of the design basis violations reported by 
nuclear power plants in 1998, only 1% had some safety significance. 
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6. EXAMPLES OF QRA INSIGHTS 
 
The publication of the Reactor Safety Study (RSS)1 in 1975 and subsequent industry-
sponsored PRAs18 had a tremendous impact on the thinking of nuclear safety experts.  
Several major new insights were as follows (see, for example, reference 19): 
 
• Prior thinking was that the (unquantified) frequency of severe core damage was 
extremely low and that the consequences of such damage would be catastrophic.  
The RSS calculated a core damage frequency on the order of one event every 
10,000 to 100,000 reactor-years, a much higher number than anticipated, and 
showed that the consequences would not always be catastrophic. 
 
• A significant failure path for radioactivity release that bypasses the containment 
building was identified.  Traditional safety analysis methods had failed to do so. 
 
• The significance of common-cause failures of redundant components and the 
significance of human errors were demonstrated quantitatively. 
 
An early QRA for the auxiliary power units (APUs) on the shuttle’s orbiter produced 
some interesting results20.  A traditional qualitative method for developing failure modes 
(Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) had been employed to identify hazards.  Of the 313 
scenarios identified, 106 were placed on the so-called critical items list using 
conservative screening criteria.   
 
• The QRA showed that 99% of the probability of loss of crew/vehicle was 
contributed by 20 scenarios, two of which had not been on the critical items list. 
 
• Clearly, risk management is much more effective when one has to deal with 20 
scenarios as opposed to the 106 of the critical items list, which, in addition, 
missed two important scenarios. 
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• The QRA demonstrated, once again, the significance of common-cause and 
cascading failures.  These failure modes are handled very poorly in traditional 
safety methods. 
 
Unlike the QRAs for nuclear power reactors and the space shuttle, the QRA for the 
Tooele incinerator of chemical munitions was performed while the facility was still under 
construction.  This allowed the use of QRA insights in design and operation changes11, 21.  
For example, the QRA identified a scenario that dominated worker risk, which involved 
the potential for buildup and ignition of agent vapors in a furnace feed airlock.  As a 
result of this finding, a hardware change was implemented to vent the airlock and 
preclude agent buildup.  In addition, the operations were changed to limit the time any 
item is held in the feed airlock. 
 
 
7. RISK-INFORMED DECISION-MAKING 
 
I wish to make one thing very clear:  QRA results are never the sole basis for decision-
making by responsible groups.  In other words, safety-related decision-making is risk-
informed, not risk-based.  The requirements of the traditional safety analysis that I 
described above are largely intact. 
 
In all three examples that I have been using (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NASA, 
and the Tooele incinerator), the safety requirements are overwhelmingly traditional.  
Only the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which, as I have stated in Section 1, has 
entered Phase 3, has a formal process for modifying some traditional requirements using 
risk insights2.   
 
Even in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s case, however, it is interesting to see how 
cautious the Commission was when it issued its policy statement in 199522:  “The use of 
PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by 
the state of the art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRC's 
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deterministic approach and supports the NRC's traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.”  
The Commissioners made it very clear that PRA insights were to be scrutinized and were 
subordinate to the traditional safety philosophy of defense-in-depth. 
 
At this time, formal methods for combining risk information with traditional safety 
methods do not exist.  The process relies on the judgment of the decision-makers and is 
akin to the analytic-deliberative process that the National Research Council has 
recommended for environmental decision-making23. 
 
The continuous risk management process that NASA employs is similar in the sense that 
risk information is only one of the many inputs that the process considers. 
 
 
8. COMMENTARY ON FREQUENTLY RAISED CRITICISMS 
 
All QRA analysts care about is the bottom-line numbers. 
 
I know of no QRA analysts who act this way (and I know a lot of them).  The 
uncertainties about the results and the dominant scenarios are the results that experienced 
analysts look for.  The lower the probabilities that are reported, the more suspicious these 
analysts become. 
 
QRAs are performed to understand how the system can fail and to prioritize the failure 
modes, not to produce a set of numbers.  The only QRA results that have any chance of 
influencing risk management are those that provide engineering insights. 
 
NASA doesn’t seem to be able to get the numbers for the Shuttle right. 
 
This is an interesting comment that one encounters frequently.  Old studies are cited24 
that apparently produced very low failure probabilities for the shuttle (as low as once 
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every 100,000 flights).  Then, it is pointed out that there have been two failures in 113 
shuttle flights; therefore, QRAs are no good. 
 
An early QRA for the shuttle25 gives a probability for the loss of vehicle that ranges from 
once every 230 flights to once every 76 flights.  The analysts state that they are 90% 
confident that the failure probability is in this interval.  The reported interval is on the 
right order of magnitude, especially for a first effort that has not been peer reviewed 
formally and in an industry that is still in Phase 1 of QRA development.  I doubt very 
much that the old studies mentioned above had been subjected to the rigorous peer review 
process that modern QRAs receive. 
 
But this criticism raises another important point.  There is a presumption that QRA 
should “get the number right” right away.  This does not allow time for the technology to 
mature in the NASA environment.  As I mentioned in Section 1, the nuclear power 
industry has had plenty of time to improve its PRAs and one would indeed expect its 
numerical results to be consistent with operating experience.  NASA, on the other hand, 
is still exploring what QRAs can do and how to apply them realistically to its systems, 
some of which are very different from nuclear power applications.  For example, 
methodological improvements are needed to handle the dynamic nature of space flights.   
I believe that the agency should be given time to make this technology part of its standard 
analytical tools. 
 
The fundamental question should not be whether old studies failed to accurately predict 
the number (although the results I cited above show that this is not quite true).  The 
question should be:  what did NASA do with these numbers?  The answer is: very little, if 
anything.  There are no guidelines as to which numbers are acceptable and, as I have said 
several times, the traditional safety requirements are intact.  It is the impact on decision-
making that matters, not that some study produced indefensible numbers. 
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Having seen first-hand how PRAs have improved safety in the nuclear power industry, I 
believe strongly that it would be a disservice to the nation, if NASA were discouraged 
from using this technology. 
 
QRA results are not useful when they are highly uncertain.  Why bother doing a QRA in 
those cases? 
 
These uncertainties exist independently of whether we do a QRA or not.  The decisions 
that need to be made will be better if quantitative information that has been peer reviewed 
is available.  Recall the misperceptions of the frequency and consequences of core 
damage that nuclear safety professionals had before the Reactor Safety Study was issued 
(Section 6).  
 
By attempting to quantify the uncertainties and to identify the dominant contributors, 
QRA analysts contribute to the common understanding of the issues and, in addition, may 
provide useful input to the allocation of research resources. 
 
Probabilities cannot be realistically calculated. 
 
This criticism presumably means that one cannot use straightforward statistical methods 
and divide the number of failures by the number of trials to calculate “realistic” 
probabilities.  This criticism appears to miss the point that QRAs are performed for 
systems that are highly reliable and well defended, so a plethora of failures does not exist 
(and is highly undesirable to begin with).  QRA methods analyze rare events in a 
systematic way and use all the available information in evaluating probabilities.  QRA 
analysts are fully aware of the extensive use of expert judgment and always look at the 
uncertainties associated with the results.  As I have stated, peer reviews are essential.  
Ultimately, the decision-making process is risk-informed and not risk-based. 
 
QRAs do not include “one technician’s unbelievable stupidity”5 
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I don’t know how one defines “unbelievable stupidity,” so I have difficulty dealing with 
this criticism.  Of course, these facilities are usually operated by crews of several people, 
so I am not sure how many trained persons would have to behave in an unbelievably 
stupid manner for something extraordinary to happen.  As I mentioned above (Section 5), 
QRAs do not model acts of unbelievable intelligence either, which, as the operating 
experience shows, occur frequently. 
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